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Recent Banking Sector Reforms 
in Japan
Hiroshi Nakaso
uring the past year, in which major reforms
to deal with the country’s financial system
problems were undertaken, the Bank of
Japan focused on two tasks. The first was
the establishment of a framework in which a bank failure
could be handled in a flexible way with minimum negative
impact on the stability of the financial system. It was
thought essential to introduce a framework that could
maintain the franchise value of a problem bank. This was
particularly important for dealing with the failure of a
bank like Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), which
had an international presence and whose failure thus had
systemic implications for the global financial system: as of
the end of March 1998, LTCB had outstanding ¥51.5 tril-
lion notional principal in derivatives transactions, which
were typically cross-border. The second was to maintain
the framework of capital injection using public funds. The
Bank of Japan has argued that the core of Japan’s financial
system problems is the undercapitalization of many, if not
all, Japanese banks. It was quite natural that an accelerated,
accumulated charge-off of bad loans after the bursting of
the bubble in the early 1990s ended up eating up the
capital account of a bank. As banks’ profitability and
access to private capital markets were limited, public
funds were almost the only source of money to immedi-
ately strengthen the capital position of viable banks.
Diet discussions produced two significant pieces
of legislation: the Law Concerning Emergency Measures
for the Reconstruction of the Functions of the Financial
System, and the Financial Function Early Restoration Law.
An outline of these laws is shown in Figure 1. The Law
Concerning Emergency Measures for the Reconstruction of
the Functions of the Financial System (commonly referred
to as the Financial Reconstruction Law) is a useful frame-
work within which the authorities can deal with a failed
bank without necessarily finding a sound receiving bank
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The Framework of the Financial Reconstruction Law and the Financial Function Early Restoration Law
Financial Reconstruction 
Commission
• independent administrative     
commission established as an 
external organ of the Prime 
Minister’s Office
• composed of five members, 
including a cabinet minister who 
serves as chairman
• vested with the planning authority 
on matters concerning the resolution 
of financial institution failures and 
financial crisis management, as well 
as the authority to inspect and 
supervise financial institutions
• parent organ of the Financial 
Supervisory Agency and the Stock 
Pricing Commission
orders issued to FRA:
·to investigate and report
·to establish a plan, etc.
public bridge bank to be 
terminated within one 
year from the order to 
place the original 
institution under 
administration













Financial Institution under 
Administration = X’ Bank
Temporarily Nationalized Bank 
(Special Public Administration 
Bank) = X’’ Bank
administration to be terminated 
within one year (could be 
extended for additional one year)
·order to place under FRA
·cancellation of the order
·recognition of failure
·choice of a failure resolution method
X Bank
·decision to commence 
a special public 
administration







·approval of the appointment and dismissal of 
management staff
·order to investigate and report
·approval of a business rationalization plan
·approval of criteria regarding loan extension, etc.
·requirement to submit data and report













termination of special public administration by March 




























aTemporary nationalization (special public administration) can be applied to a financial institution in danger of failure.
bRCC is authorized to purchase assets from financial institutions under administration, bridge banks, special public administration banks, and other financial institutions.
beforehand. LTCB was nationalized under the Financial
Reconstruction Law. Under the framework, everything,
including loss coverage and daily funding of a nationalized
bank, is covered by the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC)
in order to maintain the franchise value of the bank and to
clean up its balance sheet. Throughout the temporary
nationalization, until a sound receiving financial institu-
tion is found, the bank continues to provide its financial
services while fully meeting its liabilities.
The new capital injection framework under the
Financial Function Early Restoration Law has available
¥25 trillion of public funds. The primary objective of the
capital injection was to restore confidence in Japanese
banks and thus in the financial system as a whole. There
may be various reasons for the lack of confidence in banks.
For example, unrealized capital losses from securities hold-
ings were not deducted from capital in calculating the
capital ratio. Although this practice is justifiable as long as
a bank adopts “original cost accounting standards,” the
figures are publicly disclosed and market players could
easily calculate the “effective capital ratio” by subtracting
the unrealized losses from the capital position of a bank.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 3
Furthermore, charge-offs and provisioning of Japanese
banks were regarded as generally insufficient. Against this
background, the Financial Reconstruction Commission
(FRC) decided to take these two points into account in
calculating the required capital for fifteen major banks. As
shown in Tables 1 and 2, the total amount of public capital
injected is ¥7.5 trillion. Of this, ¥6.2 trillion is in the form of
preferred stock. The unrealized capital losses for the fifteen
major banks as of September 1998 stood at ¥2.7 trillion.
The amount of nonperforming loans to be disposed of as of
the end of March this year stands at ¥9.0 trillion. This
figure is based on the new guideline established by the
FRC. Specifically, loans to borrowers who are judged “close
to bankruptcy”—loans almost equivalent to the so-called
grade III loans have to be written down by around 70 per-
cent. Meanwhile, the substandard portion of any loan to a
“marked” borrower, which includes past-due and restruc-
tured loans, is to be written down by around 15 percent.
Other loans to a marked borrower should be written down
by appropriate provisioning rates based on historical losses.
(Thus, grade II loans are also to be appropriately disposed
of.) Given the net core operating profit of ¥2.5 trillion, the
total scale of capital injection—amounting to ¥9.5 trillion,
including  ¥7.5 trillion of public funds—is sufficient to
cover both the unrealized capital losses from securities
Table 1
AMOUNTS AND TERMS OF THE CAPITAL INJECTION
Amounts of Public Funds 
to Be Injected








Sakura 800 800 - 1.37 Preferred stock
only
Dai-Ichi 
   Kangyo
900 700 200 0.41~2.38
Fuji 1,000 800 200 0.40~2.10
Sumitomo 501 501 - 0.35~0.95 Preferred stock
only
Sanwa 700 600 100 0.53
Tokai 600 600 - 0.93~0.97 Preferred stock
only
Asahi 500 400 100 1.15~1.48





IBJ 600 350 250 0.43~1.40
Mitsubishi
   Trust
300 200 100 0.81
Sumitomo
   Trust
200 100 100 0.76
Mitsui
   Trust
400 250 150 1.25 Conversion right 
exercisable after 
three months 










Yokohama 200 100 100 1.13~1.89
     Total 7,459 6,159 1,300
a  The rate is for preferred stock. Figures are in percentages. Some banks launch 
different types of preferred stock.
Table 2
AMOUNTS OF CAPITAL ENHANCEMENT VERSUS ESTIMATED 
AMOUNTS OF NONPERFORMING LOANS (NPL) 
TO BE DISPOSED OF AND UNREALIZED GAINS/LOSSES 
FROM SECURITIES HOLDINGS
Billions of Yen 

















Sakura  1,145 800 206 -994 -475
Dai-Ichi
   Kangyo  900 900 240 -970 -209
Fuji  1,217 1,000 215 -700 -588
Sumitomo 841 501 335 -1,050 46
Sanwa  880 700 305 -900 -25
Tokai 700 600 130 -560 -115
Asahi 645 500 136 -634 -158
Daiwa 460 408 53 -363 -381
IBJ 918 600 206 -900 -34
Mitsubishi
   Trust 300 300 213 -501 115
Sumitomo
   Trust 373 200 164 -395 -89
Mitsui 
   Trust 509 400 95 -418 -362
Toyo Trust 300 200 105 -365 -144
Chuo Trust 222 150 60 -104 -185
Yokohama  200 200 75 -190 -73
     Total 9,609 7,459 2,536 -9,044 -2,678
a Net core operating profit equals net operating profit (before transfer to general 
loan-loss reserves and before write-offs for trust accounts) minus profits earned 
from bond-related transactions.4F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999
holdings and the potential losses arising from the stricter
guidelines for write-offs and provisioning. This will leave
banks with sufficiently high capital ratios even after
deducting unrealized losses from capital accounts, a calcu-
lation that is not required in bank financial statements
under the original cost accounting standards. 
Prior to capital injection, the FRC had to make sure
that the banks were viable and that the investment would be
fully recovered. A few cases gave rise to some uncertainties.
In order to eliminate such uncertainties, the FRC required
explicit plans to improve profitability that included, in some
cases, withdrawal of all overseas offices. The “management
improvement plan” was submitted to the FRC by each bank
upon receiving capital and was made public subsequently.
The FRC plans to check, on a regular basis, whether banks’
actions continue to be consistent with the plans. Further-
more, for some banks, the timing for the government to
acquire the right to convert preferred stock into common
stock was set for a relatively short time after the injection.
This suggests that the government could intervene directly
in the management of these banks, should their perfor-
mance prove to be less than satisfactory. 
With regard to the underwriting terms of the pre-
ferred stock, three factors were assessed: a) the performance
of the bank (for example, profitability, funding capacity),
b) the nature of the instrument (for example, the date when
conversion rights are exercisable and the minimum exercise
price), and c) the management improvement plan. These
factors were put into an evaluation model to calculate
the appropriate cost of capital. With regard to the man-
agement improvement plan, positive factors such as
restructuring, cost reduction, and corporate reorganization
were reflected in the rate of return in a way that made the
capital cost cheaper for those banks with more comprehen-
sive measures. This gave an incentive to banks to positively
restructure their business.
As part of their management improvement plans,
banks will pursue rationalizing efforts. Table 3 shows the
Table 3
PLANNED BANK RESTRUCTURINGS
 Workforce Personnel Expenses 
Nonpersonnel Expenses, Excluding 
Investment in Mechanization 
Number of 
Personnel 
































Sakura 16,700 13,200  -21.0 180 152 -15.5 195 186 -4.9
Dai-Ichi Kangyo  16,130 13,200  -18.2 166 138 -16.5 166 149 -10.2
Fuji a 14,250 13,000  -8.8 153 138 -10.1 137 133 -3.3
Sumitomo 15,000 13,000  -13.3 156 147 -5.6 138 129 -6.5
Sanwa 13,600 11,400  -16.2 148 126 -15.4 144 141 -2.4
Tokai 11,125 9,731  -12.5 112 93 -16.9 90 83 -7.5
Asahi  12,800 11,800  -7.8 114 107 -5.9 94 93 -1.1
Daiwa 7,640 6,300   -17.5 63 52 -17.0 92 90 -2.4
IBJ 4,776 4,482  -6.2 69 68 -0.9 61 50 -18.0
Mitsubishi Trust 4,932 4,695  -4.8 68 63 -8.3 60 60 -0.4
Sumitomo Trust 5,900 5,200  -11.9 61 52 -14.8 57 54 -5.1
Mitsui Trust/
   Chuo Trustb 9,980 8,900  -10.8 91 82 -10.4 78 72 -8.6
Toyo Trust 4,100 3,400  -17.1 42 38 -9.9 31 30 -2.3
Yokohama 5,718 4,512  -21.1 51 43 -14.9 42 40 -4.1
        Total 142,651 122,820  -13.9 1,474 1,299 -11.9 1,384 1,308
a Unconsolidated basis.
bAfter-merger figures are used for end of March 2003.
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outline. To cut personnel expenses 12 percent by March
2003, the workforce will be reduced by 14 percent. Non-
personnel expenses will also be curtailed, with the exception
of investments for automation. As for overseas business,
five banks, of which one is a regional bank, plan to with-
draw entirely from abroad, and most other banks are closing
unprofitable overseas branches or reviewing the business
structure of these branches. Banks have also made the
capital enhancement measure an opportunity for mergers
and tie-ups. In this way, developments leading to an overall
reorganization of the financial industry are currently
under way.
Undoubtedly, the capital injection is an important
step in the right direction. But it is not the ultimate
measure to achieve the final goal of overcoming the bank-
ing problem. Further steps must be taken. Banks must
remove bad loans from their balance sheets to improve
their cash flow. This is an important step toward restoring
their financial intermediary function, which in turn would
contribute to an economic recovery. Also, further consoli-
dation is necessary. By promoting consolidation in an
effective way, the banking system will gain efficiency and
profitability.
With regard to the removal of bad loans from
banks’ balance sheets, an important element is to pro-
vide the market with adequate infrastructure. Measures
have been taken in this area. They include the creation of
the RCC—the Resolution and Collection Corporation—as
a result of a merger between the Resolution and Collection
Bank (RCB) and the Housing Loan Administration Corpo-
ration (HLAC). A feature of the new law is that the RCC
can now purchase bad loans not only from failed banks but
also from solvent operating banks, helping them to remove
their bad loans from their balance sheets. In addition, a
legal framework for securitization of bad loans using
special-purpose companies is now in place and is thus
available. It is expected that banks will start to utilize these
measures. An important prerequisite in this regard is that
transactions are executed at market price or fair value, that
is, a price that can be obtained by an objective method that
effectively reflects the true value of real estate and related
loans. This is a key feature for restoring business confidence
in the real estate market. With regard to consolidation, we
are starting to see good signs in the form of mergers and
alliances in the context of capital injection, with the
announcement by some banks of explicit plans. Banks are
expected to identify the business areas of relative advantage
from a deregulated wider choice of financial business and
seek further profitability and efficiency through consolida-
tion in the broader context of the Japanese Big Bang.
The measures taken so far are intended to restore
the financial intermediary function and to reform our
banking system into a sounder, more efficient, and robust
financial industry. It is quite obvious that an improved
financial industry will better serve the economy in the
longer run. But in the meantime, the transition might
exacerbate uncertainties in various parts of the economy.
For example, large-scale disposal of real estate may have a
negative impact on land prices. Such uncertainties in the
transition process may be an argument for macroeconomic
policies to support the economic recovery. Also, it will be
necessary to handle the remaining problems in the banking
Table 4










   securities in custody 3,898.3
Japanese government
   securities 49,469.5
Foreign exchange 3,574.9
Loans to Deposit 
   Insurance 
   Corporation 6,652.7
Deposits with 
   agencies 3,354.2
Cash collateral in
   exchange for
   Japanese 
   government 
   securities borrowed 4,101.2
Other 861.4
     Total 79,100.3
Note:  Figures are as of end of March 1999.
Liabilities and Capital Accounts
Banknotes 51,286.6
Current deposits and
  other deposits 6,174.8
Deposits of the Japanese
  government 2,024.3
Bills sold 9,999.1
Japanese government
  securities borrowed 3,898.3
Other 686.1
Allowances and accrued 
   liabilities 2,898.1
Capital 0.1
Reserves 2,132.6
     Total 79,100.36F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999
Figure 2
The Structure of Japan’s Safety Net
Deposit Insurance Corporation
    •established July 1971
    •16 employees (March 1996)
Deposit Insurance Corporation
    •350 employees (March 1999)
other financial institutions failed financial institutions
purchase of nonperforming loans
business transfer 
purchase of nonperforming loans
•established April 1999
•1,900 employees (April 1999)
Resolution and Collection Bank
•established September 1996
•850 employees (September 1998)
Housing Loan Administration Corporation
•established July 1996
•1,050 employees (September 1998)
Resolution and Collection Corporation
merger
100% subsidiary
system in a smooth way under the current safety net frame-
work, fully acknowledging the importance of preventing
any major financial disruption from materializing.
Another unique aspect of the central bank involve-
ment in dealing with the financial instability is the lending
to the DIC. Table 4 shows that the outstanding amount of
such loans by the Bank of Japan stood at ¥6.7 trillion as of
the end of March. Given the long-term nature of such
loans, a disproportionate increase may threaten flexible
monetary operation by the Bank. Against this background,
the Bank has reiterated that the loans to the DIC must
be of a temporary nature, or a “bridge financing,” until
they are replaced by loans from private financial institu-
tions in the future. This was the case with the loan to the
DIC for the purpose of capital injection. The DIC primarily
carried out auctions to borrow money from private finan-
cial institutions on a government-guaranteed basis. The
auctions to finance the DIC for the purpose of capital
injection proved to be very successful. Foreign institu-
tions were active participants. As a result, the DIC was
able to raise ¥6.3 trillion at a cost well below the current
official discount rate of 0.5 percent. The remaining
¥1.2 trillion was financed by the Bank of Japan at the
official discount rate. The FRC gave assurances that the
DIC would repay the loan from the Bank of Japan in four
years at the latest. In addition, in order to diversify the
funding instruments for the DIC, the Bank is asking the
DIC to issue government-guaranteed bonds. 
The safety net that has been built up over the years
is quite comprehensive. Given the current status of the
Japanese banking system, this is indispensable. But it has
side effects too: the cost of public intervention and moral
hazard, among others. These are not consistent with the
principles of the Big Bang (Free, Fair, Global). That is why
the safety net is designed to be a temporary framework,
with all depositors and creditors fully protected in any
bank failure until March 2001. There are arguments for
extending this period because the banking system may
continue to be fragile. But we intend to adhere to the orig-
inal plan as it will encourage banks to take measures to
restructure themselves into a more competitive industry in
a timely manner. Depositors will naturally become more
selective in choosing their banks as March 2001
approaches. This means that banks have a limited time to
transform themselves into a stronger industry. Meanwhile,
a study group consisting of academics, regulators, andFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 7
central bankers has been set up to design a new safety
net framework that would be consistent with the more
efficient and competitive financial system expected to
emerge in the years beyond March 2001.
Measures taken so far will certainly contribute to
the restoration of the financial system. We recognize that
we have been criticized for slowness in taking action, but the
problem we have been dealing with is unprecedented in
terms of scale and seriousness and the instruments initially
available to handle the problem were very limited. Only
three years ago, the DIC had a staff of only sixteen and as
little as ¥390 billion in funds. Now, as Figure 2 shows,
the DIC along with the RCC has more than 2,000 staff
members and ¥60 trillion of public funds available. The
flexibility of the safety net has evolved significantly over
the years. In fact, more than fifty institutions have already
been resolved since 1992 under the deposit insurance
framework. In dealing with the problem, the Bank has
consistently tried its best to fulfill its responsibility to
maintain financial system stability. There were painful
moments, such as the loss of the ¥80 billion investment in
Nippon Credit Bank and the subsequent criticism of the
Bank, but it is our belief that the Bank’s actions were nec-
essary to avert a major disruption. Indeed, a systemic crisis
has been successfully avoided in Japan, and we remain fully
committed to our responsibility to prevent any crisis that
could threaten the stability of the financial system. Hope-
fully, before long, our efforts to overcome the country’s
banking problems will represent an episode in history that
we can look back on with pride and satisfaction.
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